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Abstract 
The welfare dominance of ad valorem taxes over unit taxes in a single-market Cournot 
oligopoly is well-known. This article extends the analysis to multi-market oligopoly. Provided 
all ad valorem taxes are positive, unit costs are constant, firms are active in all considered 
markets, and a representative consumer has convex preferences, it is shown that ad valorem 
taxes dominate in multi-product equilibrium. We discuss the role of unit cost covariances across 
multi-product firms in determining the extent of cost efficiencies arising under ad valorem 
taxation. The issue of merger under oligopoly is also considered. Conditions are identified under 
which a merger increases the sum of consumer and producer surpluses while also increasing the 
revenue yield from a set of unit taxes. If not all firms are active in all considered markets, then it 
is also shown that additional conditions are required to ensure the dominance of ad valorem 
taxes. In multi-input Cournot oligopsony, however, unit taxation welfare dominates. This is 
because ad valorem taxes on inputs reduce demand elasticities, amplifying market power 
distortions. 
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1.  Introduction 
The choice between per unit taxation and ad valorem taxation in imperfectly competitive 
markets has received continuing attention since Suits and Musgrave (1953). It is an important 
issue because imperfect competition characterizes many markets and sales taxes are an important 
source of government revenue at state and local levels throughout the world. As Skeath and 
Trandel (1994) point out, both tax structures have commonly been used. Delipalla and Keen 
(1992), for same-cost firms, and Denicolò and Matteuzzi (2000), for heterogeneous-cost firms, 
confirm the welfare dominance of ad valorem taxes under Cournot behavior in single product 
oligopoly. Thus an ad valorem tax that holds aggregate output the same as a specific tax both 
reduces firm costs and increases tax receipts. Anderson, de Palma, and Kreider (2001) have 
extended consideration to product differentiation and price-setting behavior to find that ad 
valorem taxes no longer necessarily dominate. Kitahara and Matsumura (2006) show that the 
choice of tax system can affect firm location decisions, and so consumer surplus, for price-
setting firms when products are location differentiated. Blackorby and Murty (2007) show 
equivalence between the taxes under monopoly in general equilibrium when profits are taxed and 
revenues are returned to consumers. They show that Pareto optima are the same under either tax. 
Missing from the literature are models acknowledging that most firms in imperfectly 
competitive markets are multi-product. We develop such a model in the Cournot setting. Our 
model assumes constant unit costs, as with most of the literature, but marginal costs can differ 
across firms and products. The demand side is characterized by a representative consumer with 
convex preferences. Making the assumption that all firms are active in all considered markets, 
we show that dominance of the ad valorem tax system extends to multi-markets. We also show 
that the extent of dominance depends on cost correlations across firms and on whether goods 
substitute or complement in demand. 
Our multi-product model also allows for consideration of conglomerate mergers. For 
specific tax levels that hold market outputs fixed, we find conditions under which conglomerate 
mergers increase the tax yield. We also identify conditions under which mergers both decrease 
industry costs and increase tax revenues, so that conglomerate mergers can then be viewed as 
welfare dominating.  
Our assumption that all firms are active in all considered markets is scrutinized. Relaxing it, 
we show that it is probably best for conglomerate firms (rather than single-product firms) to have 
most of the variability in unit costs. This is because they are best positioned to adjust outputs 
while market level outputs are not affected by the shift in cost variability. For ad valorem taxes 
to dominate specific taxes when firms are inactive in some markets, additional conditions are 
needed. This is because the effects of taxes on outputs depend on what other products a firm 
markets through demand-side interactions. Since multi-product Cournot markets in which some 
firms are inactive in some considered markets is a plausible economic environment, we conclude 
that welfare dominance of ad valorem taxes is questionable.  
The final main section develops on Hamilton’s (1999) observation that dominance is 
reversed when market power is on the part of a single market monopsonist. We find dominance 
reversal to be true for multi-input Cournot oligopsonists. The reason is that ad valorem taxes then 
dampen, rather than magnify, the effective elasticity the firms with market power face. This 
modifies distortions such that aggregate revenues contract. We conclude with a brief summary. 
 
2.  Framework 
The model of multi-product Cournot behavior for a representative consumer is based on that 
in Lapan and Hennessy (2006). Each of  firms is active in all of N M  markets while there are 
 price-taking consumers. Firms are denoted as H {1,2, ... , } Nn N∈ =Ω  while markets and 
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consumers are identified similarly. The aggregate level of the mth good available for 
consumption is mX  and the vector of goods available for consumption is 1( , ... , )MX X X= .  
Direct utility from consuming goods in the M  markets is , a concave function. Prices are 
. Aggregate income available across all consumers is 
( )U X
( ),mP X m∈ΩM I  and  is the numeraire 
good so that  and the price-taking representative consumer’s problem is 
z
( )
M
mm
z I P X X∈Ω= −∑ m
m mmax ( )
M
X m
I U X P X∈Ω+ −∑ . This consumer-level optimization gives inverse demand 
functions as .  ( ) ( ) / ( )m mP X U X X U X= ∂ ∂ ≡ m
On the production side,  is the constant unit cost for the nth firm when producing the mth 
good. The nth firm produces vector 
n
mc
1 2( , , ... , )
n n n
Mx x x  where . The firm solves 
 under Nash-Cournot conjectures, i.e., assuming the 
outputs of other firms are fixed. Firm reaction functions are described by  
0nmx m> ∀ ∈ΩM
m⎤⎦
N
1 2( , , ... , )
max ( )n n n
M M
n n
m mx x x m
U X c x∈Ω ⎡ −⎣∑
,( ) ( ) ( ) 0 , .M
n n n
sm m mm m ms s M
s m
U X c U X x U X x m n∈Ω
≠
− + + = ∀ ∈Ω ∀ ∈Ω∑  (1) 
The summation term in (1) captures demand-side interaction effects that the producer seeks to 
exploit. It is assumed that (1) has a unique pure-strategy interior solution. Choice variables in 
the solution are described by ˆnmx .
1 In summary, our assumptions are 
Assumption set AS. Consumer preferences are quasi-linear so that a representative consumer 
exists. Preferences are also convex and consumers are price-takers. Unit costs are constant, but 
firm-specific, in each considered market and firms are active in all considered markets. Firms 
are quantity-setting Nash-Cournot decision-makers, and there exists a unique equilibrium.  
 
3.  Comparing tax systems 
                                                 
1 As with single-product oligopoly models, but perhaps more so, uniqueness and stability are 
concerns in multi-product oligopoly models. These issues are developed in Okuguchi and 
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Suppose a government raises taxes by imposing a uniform tax, be it unit or ad valorem, on 
each unit of a good produced. This is unit tax  in the mth market or ad valorem tax mt mτ  in that 
same market. For the sake of concision in algebra the ad valorem tax is written in mark-down 
form, i.e., nth firm net firm revenue is (1 ) ( )
M
n
m m mm
U X xτ∈Ω −∑ . The question we ask is whether 
one can identify one of the tax systems as being more efficient. Anderson, de Palma, and 
Kreider (2001) looked at this question for a single output market where firms compete in 
Cournot manner and have heterogeneous unit production costs. They demonstrated that of the 
two systems, the ad valorem tax can (a) raise more revenue while at the same time (b) reduce 
industry costs and (c) deliver the same output level. We extend their approach to a multi-product 
oligopoly. 
Under alternative tax systems, the private Nash optimality conditions (1) become  
  (2) Unit : ( ) ( ) 0 , .
M
n n
m m m ms s Ms
U X c t U X x m n∈Ω− − + = ∀ ∈Ω ∀ ∈Ω∑ N
N Ad val: ( )(1 ) ( )(1 ) 0 , .
M
n n
m m m ms s s Ms
U X c U X x m nτ τ∈Ω− − + − = ∀ ∈Ω ∀ ∈Ω∑  (3) 
Upon evaluating at equilibrium, averaging, and differencing, we find that market-by-market 
total output is the same under either tax system whenever taxes are chosen to satisfy  
 1( ) ( ) ; .
M N
av av n
m m m s ms s M s ss n
t U X U X x m x x
N
τ τ∈Ω ∈Ω= + ∀ ∈Ω =∑ ∑  (4) 
Given the τ  vector and equilibrium nmx  choices denoted by ˆnmx , one can solve directly for 
the specific tax levels. Conversely, given the specific tax vector, one can solve for the ad 
valorem tax equivalents by inverting system (4). The system immediately conveys the 
following:  
Proposition 1. Under AS, suppose that  
(a) all goods are complements in demand in that . If the ad valorem 
taxes are positive then the specific tax solutions to (4) are also positive. 
0 , ,ms MU m s s≥ ∀ ∈Ω ≠ m
                                                                                                                                                             
Szidarovszky (1990) and Szidarovszky and Li (2000). 
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(b) some pair of goods are substitutes in demand in that 0msU <  for some . 
Then there exists a strictly positive ad valorem tax vector such that, for the specific tax vector 
that yields the same output, at least one specific tax is strictly negative. 
, ,Mm s s m∈Ω ≠
 
We have not asserted that positive specific taxes satisfying (4) ensure positive ad valorem 
taxes under complementary goods, nor do we believe this to be the case for all such specific tax 
vectors and demand structures. The proof of part (a) is immediate from (4), while that of part (b) 
follows from setting sτ  to be orders of magnitudes larger than the other ad valorem taxes. We 
have next:  
Proposition 2. Under AS, suppose a government compares two tax policies, unit taxes and ad 
valorem taxes, that lead to the same aggregate output levels. Then, provided that all ad valorem 
tax rates are non-negative, a vector of commodity-specific ad valorem taxes, mτ : (a) raises 
more revenue; and (b) results in lower costs, and hence higher producer surplus and economic 
efficiency than the corresponding set of commodity-specific unit taxes,  mt .
 
Corollary 2.1. Under the circumstances of Proposition 2, consider a monopolist in a single 
output market, i.e., . Then inferences (a) and (b) apply.1N M= = 2
 
The corollary was first shown as Theorem 1 in Skeath and Trandel (1994). The proof of 
Proposition 2, as with others that are not immediate, is provided in the Appendix. The ad 
valorem system penalizes high cost firms more than low cost firms, as scaling by 1 mτ−  in (3) 
leads to the map /(1 )n nm m mc c τ→ − .3 This shifts production toward lower-cost firms. Since 
                                                 
2 For part (b), costs are the same across taxes in monopoly since firm output is the same. 
3 Another useful way of thinking about how equations (2) and (3) compare is to note that the 
1 sτ−  effectively increase the demand elasticities that firms face. As a consequence, they behave 
more like competitive firms when making supply choices. Yet total outputs remain fixed, 
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aggregate production remains fixed, this shift in production reduces industry costs. It is likely to 
be particularly effective in doing so when all goods complement in demand. Then  nmc →
/(1 )nmc mτ−  encourages production by low cost firms in the mth good and, through (1), also in 
the sth good. Cost covariances across firms also matter in determining cost efficiencies. 
Example 1 illustrates how this is so.  
Example 1. Let , i.e., it is the covariance across unit costs for the mth and sth 
outputs. Setting 
Cov( , )cms m sc cσ =
2M = ,  as the total cost under unit taxes when (4) applies and  as the 
total cost under ad valorem taxes, eqn. (A11) in the Appendix shows that the cost difference 
may be written as
uTC vTC
4  
 21 22 11 1 12 12 2 12 12 2 11 22 11 22 12
1 1 2 2
; (
1 1 1 1
c c c c
u v U U U UNTC TC U U Uτ σ τ σ τ σ τ στ τ τ τ
⎡ ⎤− = − − − + Φ = −⎢ ⎥Φ − − − −⎣ ⎦
) .  (5) 
Since concavity ensures that , 0Φ > 11 0U < , and 22 0U < , it follows that [ ] /u v iid TC TC d cσ−  
 when  and 0> {1,2}i∈ 0iτ > . In words, an increase in the variability of unit costs for some 
good increases the relative cost efficiency of the ad valorem tax, as compared with the output-
equivalent unit tax, provided the ad valorem tax for that good is positive.  
But 12 1 2 1 2 12 1 2[ ] / ( 2 ) /[(1 )(1
sign
u v cd TC TC d U )]σ τ τ τ τ τ τ− = + − − −
                                                                                                                                                            
. For complements, or  
, when both ad valorem taxes are non-negative and one is strictly positive then the following 
applies: an increase in the covariance between unit costs increases the cost efficiency of 
production under ad valorem taxes when compared with unit taxes. This is because both supply 
and demand side interactions align to promote more production by efficient firms while the sum 
12U
0>
 
implying that low-cost producers take market share from high-cost producers. Given market 
outputs, high-cost producers were producing too much, so this shift is socially beneficial. 
4 A general analysis of how unit cost statistical moments affect social welfare in multi-product 
Cournot oligopoly is provided in Lapan and Hennessy (2007). Determinants of how unit cost 
variance affects aggregate costs in single market oligopoly have been developed by Bergstrom 
and Varian (1985) and Salant and Shaffer (1999). 
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of unit costs do not change so that aggregate outputs are unaffected. By contrast, if 12 0U <  and 
ad valorem taxes are positive then a reduction in the covariance between unit costs promotes 
comparative cost efficiency under the ad valorem tax system.  
The cost difference in (5) is always positive, but the size of the gap depends on preferences 
and the distribution of technologies. Observe in (5) that what really matters when it comes to 
product interactions is whether . When this is true and when ad valorem taxes are 
positive then the demand and supply interactions combine to increase the magnitude of cost 
efficiency of the ad valorem tax system over the unit tax system. These interactions are also 
relevant as determinants of cost efficiency gains in the event of conglomerate mergers, and we 
will encounter them again in the next section. 
12 12 0
cU σ >
 
4.  Mergers, taxation, and welfare 
In this section, we ask what effect conglomerate mergers will have on tax revenue and on 
welfare measures. We consider two scenarios. Scenario I is separation where there are NM 
separate firms, each producing only one good. Scenario II is merger and it is the paper’s baseline 
model where there are N firms, each producing M goods. Consider the case of a sector-wide 
specific (unit) tax, namely sepmt  for Scenario I or  for Scenario II.
mer
mt
5 From (2) under separation, 
the equilibrium conditions for Scenario I are ,ˆ 0n sep n sepm m m mm mU c t U x− − + =  where ˆ sepmx  is the 
separated firm’s action under Cournot equilibrium. Separated firms do not take account of 
demand-side interactions. With (1/ )
N
av n
m mn
c N ∈Ω= c∑  and , ,ˆ ˆ(1/ ) Nav sep n sepm mnx N x∈Ω= ∑ , then the 
aggregated equilibrium conditions are: 
,ˆScen I : 0 .av sep av sepm m m mm m MU c t U x m− − + = ∀ ∈Ω  (6) 
Note that, even though there is no cross ownership, each equilibrium level of aggregate 
                                                 
5 It can readily be seen that the analysis for ad valorem taxes would be less tractable, and we do 
not consider it.  
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output, label it ˆ sepmX , depends on the whole vector of cost averages , provided 
. That is, although the linkages exist they are not exploited by firms. For Scenario II (our 
main model), the aggregate equilibrium conditions are:  
1( , ... , )
av av
Mc c
0ijU ≠
,ˆScen II : 0 ,
M
av mer av mer
m m m sm s Ms
U c t U x m∈Ω− − + = ∀ ∈Ω∑  (7) 
where  is the merged firm’s Cournot equilibrium action and . ,ˆn mermx
, ,ˆ ˆ(1/ )
N
av mer n mer
m mn
x N x∈Ω= ∑
In general, for arbitrary taxes (including zero), output will differ under the two regimes. 
However, suppose specific taxes adjust for the (on average) marginal incentive consequences of 
merger, i.e.,  
,
, ˆ ,M
sep mer av mer
sm m ms s M
s m
t t U x m∈Ω
≠
= − ∀ ∈Ω∑  (8) 
where the relation emerges from differencing (6) and (7). Then outputs under the two regimes 
will be equal, ,ˆ ˆ ˆ
N
sep mer n mer
m m mn
X X x∈Ω= ≡∑ , and we can deduce 
Proposition 3. A set of specific taxes that yields the same equilibrium output levels will generate 
more (less) tax revenue under the merged regime if all goods are complements (substitutes) in the 
inverse demand sense. That is, if taxes are chosen under the two regimes to yield equal outputs 
then the difference in tax revenue, , is: ˆ( )
M
mer sep mer
m m mm
t t X∈Ω −∑
, ,
,
0    if 0 , , ;
ˆ ˆ
0    if 0 , , .MM
sm Mav mer av mer
s sm s mm s m sm M
U m s s
N U x x
U m s s∈Ω∈Ω ≠
≥ ≥ ∀ ∈Ω⎧⎨ mm
≠
≤ ≤ ∀ ∈Ω ≠⎩∑ ∑  (9) 
 
Note that while (9) looks like a quadratic form, it is not because the diagonal elements are 
omitted. When all goods complement in demand, then merger strengthens the incentive for 
efficient firms to expand. This allows the tax authority to levy higher unit taxes and still achieve 
the same output levels. Tax receipts increase for each good. If some goods are substitutes, and 
some complements, then the result is ambiguous. Notice too that the conditions in (9) are not 
necessary. The possibility exists for the government to raise more tax revenue, at the same output 
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levels, under firm mergers even when there are some substitution interactions in demand. Indeed, 
if we are willing to assume the sub-utility function  is a homogeneous function and also 
assume a bound on own-price responsiveness then this is the case. 
( )U X
Corollary 3.1. Suppose  is homogenous of degree ( )U X 1h < . Then, comparing taxes that yield 
the same outputs under the two regimes, the specific tax for good m under Scenario I (i.e., 
separation) will be higher (lower) than that under Scenario II (i.e., merger) if  is 
greater (less) than 1/ . 
ˆ/[ ]merm m mmU X U−
(1 )h−
 
Expression  might, loosely, be viewed as the (absolute) own-price elasticity 
of demand.
ˆ/[ ]merm m mmU X U−
6 In the case of homothetic preferences, the cross-good effects under merger resolve 
into own-good effects. So the revenue authority is really considering two constrained 
maximization problems where the only difference is the own-good market elasticity. If the 
effective elasticity is lower under merger, then the unit tax will be higher. Consequently if 
 under homogeneous  then ˆmax /[ ] 1/(1 )
M
mer
m m m mmU X U h∈Ω − < − ( )U X ˆ( )
M
mer sep mer
m m mm
t t X∈Ω −∑  
, and this is true regardless of the signs of the cross elasticities. We also have  0≥
Corollary 3.2. Consider a unit tax vector under  
(a) Scenario I (i.e., separation) such that . Then the corresponding (i.e., that 
preserves aggregate output) output tax vector under the merged regime may entail a negative tax 
(i.e., a subsidy) to some sector.  
0sepmt m≥ ∀ ∈ΩM
M
                                                
(b) Scenario II (i.e., merger) such that . Then the corresponding tax vector 
under the separation regime may entail a negative tax to some sector. 
0mermt m≥ ∀ ∈Ω
 
From (8) we see that tax rates which leave consumers indifferent are higher (lower) under 
 
6 Bear in mind, though, that 1/mm mmB U≡ . 
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merger than under separation when all goods complement (substitute) in the inverse demand 
sense. To confirm part (a), suppose that 0sepmt = . Then ,, ˆMmer av mersm ms
s m
t U x∈Ω
≠
= s∑ , from (8). If all 
goods are substitutes, then this expression must be strictly negative. Then, by continuity, there 
exists a scalar 0ε >  such that if 0 sepmt ε< ≤  the resulting tax will still be negative. 
We turn now to the effects of merger on industry costs. We will focus on a two-product 
oligopoly setting, .  {1,2}MΩ =
Proposition 4. Under assumption set AS with 2M = , let unit taxes be levied in the post-merger 
situation such that aggregate outputs under merger are the same as under separation. Then 
industry costs are smaller under merger than under separation if either of the following pair of 
condition sets applies; 
2
12 12
12
11 2211 22
2
12 12
12
11 2211 22
sign( )   and  ;
sign( )   and  .
c
c c
c
c c
UU
U U
UU
U U
σ
σ σ
σ
σ σ
= + ≥ −
= − ≤
 (10) 
 
Thus, if N good A producers match off with N good B producers, then knowing the sign of 
 is not enough to ascertain the effect on industry costs. If goods complement in demand, then 
a non-negatively correlated matching of pre-merger firms suffices to ensure a lower industry 
cost post-merger. If goods substitute, then a non-positively correlated matching does so. As a 
corollary,  suffices independent of  so long as 
12U
12 0
cσ = 12sign( )U 12 0U ≠ . In the case of 
complementary demand, market power considerations encourage a firm to produce more of one 
good when it is already producing more of the other good. When a firm with a low unit cost for 
producing one good also tends to have a low unit cost for producing the other good, then 
demand complementarity guides firm production patterns toward lower total costs.  
Indeed, (10) allows the cost correlation to be negative when . If the cost 12sign( )U = +
 10
correlation is negative, then the demand-side complementarity must be sufficiently strong to 
over-ride the contrary supply-side tendency. By concavity, we know that 0.512 11 22| /( ) |U U U 1<  so 
that if the cost correlation is strongly negative then the first pair of conditions in (10) will not 
apply under demand complementarity. Concavity condition  ensures 
downward curvature along a line in  and, as such,  can be viewed 
as an index of substitution in demand between the two goods. In the case of substitution in 
demand the interpretation of (10) is similar except that the disposition is toward firms 
emphasizing one or other of the two goods.  
0.5
12 11 22| /( ) |U U U <1
)2\ 0.512 11 22 12| /( ) | sign(U U U U
Upon reviewing Proposition 3, an implication of Proposition 4 is: 
Corollary 4.1. Under assumption set AS with 2M = , let unit taxes be levied in the post-merger 
situation such that aggregate outputs under merger are the same as under separation. Under 
merger, if  
(a)  and , then both i) the sum of consumer surplus and industry profits and ii) tax 
revenue are larger;  
12 0U ≥ 12 0cσ ≥
(b)  and , then i) the sum of consumer surplus and industry profits is larger while 
ii) tax revenue is smaller. 
12 0U ≤ 12 0cσ ≤
 
All other assumptions recognized, when  and  then the corollary would favor 
a lax anti-trust approach toward cross-sector mergers. 
12 0U ≥ 12 0cσ ≥
 
5.  Some firms inactive in some markets 
In this section we relax the requirement that all firms be active in all markets. We do so in 
order to develop inferences on how our findings on taxation need to be modified. Just two 
products are considered so as to facilitate tractability and clarity, i.e., 2M = . Suppose there are 
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JN  firms, labeled as Jn∈Ψ , that produce both goods. They have unit cost vector , 1 2( , )n nc c n∈ 
JΨ . There are also  single-market firms in the mth market. These firms are labeled as SmN n∈ 
, , and each has unit cost .  ,m SΨ {1,2}m∈ nmc
Including both specific and ad valorem taxes, first-order conditions for the three considered 
firm types are 
1 1 1 2 2 2
,
ˆ ˆ: (1 ) (1 ) (1 ) 0 {1,2}
ˆ: (1 ) (1 ) 0 {1,2}.
n n n
J m m m m m m
n n
m S m m m m m m mm
n U c t x U x U m
n U c t x U m
τ τ τ
τ τ
∈Ψ − − − + − + − = ∀ ∈
∈Ψ − − − + − = ∀ ∈
;
⎞⎟⎠
 (11) 
With  
1
11 12 11 12
12 22 12 22
,
B B U U
B B U U
−⎛ ⎞ ⎛=⎜ ⎟ ⎜⎝ ⎠ ⎝
 (12) 
work in the appendix shows that for joint-product firms, i.e., Jn∀ ∈Ψ : 
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
, ,
11 1 1 12 2 2,
1 1
1
,
12 1 1 22 2 2,
2 2
2 2
ˆ ˆ ;
1 1
ˆ ˆ ;
1 1
n av J n av J
n av J
n av J n av J
n av J
B c c B c c
x x
B c c B c c
x x
τ τ
τ τ
− −− = +− −
− −− = +− −
1
,
c ˆm
 (13) 
where  and , (1/ )
J
av J J n
m mn
c N ∈Ψ= ∑ ,ˆ (1/ ) Jav J nm nx N ∈Ψ= x∑ . Using (13), total costs of production 
for jointly producing firms amount to  
( ) ( )
, , , ,
{1,2} {1,2} {1,2}
, , , , , ,
1 1 2 2 11 11 12 12 12 12 22 22
1 2
, , ,
ˆ ˆ ˆ( )(
ˆ ˆ ;
1 1
1 ( )( ).
J J
J
n n J av J av J n av J n av J
m m m m m m m mn m m n m
J J
av J J av J J c J c J c J c J
c J n av J n av J
ms m m s sJ n
c x N c x c c x x
N Nc X c X B B B B
c c c c
N
σ σ σ στ τ
σ
∈Ψ ∈ ∈ ∈Ψ ∈
∈Ψ
= + −
= + + + + +− −
= − −
∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑
∑
ˆ )−
 (14) 
Turning to single-product firms, some work with (11) leads to  
, ,
, ,1 1 2 2
1 1 1, 2 2 2,
1 11 2 22
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ; ;
(1 ) (1 )
n av S n av S
n av S n av S
S S
c c c cx x n x x n
U Uτ τ
− −− = ∀ ∈Ψ − = ∀ ∈Ψ− −  (15) 
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where  and 
,
, (1/ )
m S
av S S n
m m n
c N ∈Ψ= ∑ mc nm,ˆ ˆm SSm nX x∈Ψ=∑ . Insert into the expression for the sum of 
single-product firm costs to find that costs for these firms aggregate to 
,
, ,
, , 11 22
1 1 2 2 1 2{1,2}
1 11 2 22
ˆ ˆˆ .
(1 ) (1 )m S
c S c S
n n av S S av S S S S
m mm n
c x c X c X N N
U U
σ σ
τ τ∈ ∈Ψ = + + +− −∑ ∑  (16) 
Finally, equilibrium outputs are  and  while total cost is the 
sum of (14) and (16): 
1 1
ˆ ˆtotal J SX X X= + 1ˆ 2ˆ2 2ˆ ˆtotal J SX X X= +
( ) ( )
,
, , , , 11
1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 1
1 11
,
, , ,22
11 11 12 12 2 12 12 22 22
1 2 22 2
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ
(1 )
.
1 (1 ) 1
c S
total av S S av J J av S S av J J S
c SJ J
c J c J S c J c J
C c X c X c X c X N
U
N NB B N B B
U
σ
τ
σσ σ σ στ τ τ
= + + + + −
+ + + + +− − −
,
 (17) 
In contrast with the case where all firms were active in all markets, now any change in tax 
structure or the allocation of unit costs across firms that preserves overall unit cost variance at 
given levels will, in general, alter costs. Total production within each group (the group of single-
product firms and the group of joint-product firms) and average cost within each group will, in 
general, have to be preserved in order to preserve the value of , ,
{1,2}
ˆ ˆ( )av J J av S Sm m m mm c X c X∈ +∑ . In 
addition, the extent of reduction in total cost due to cost heterogeneity depends in general on 
where the cost heterogeneity occurs. Only when 12 0U =  will the allocation of cost variability 
between the group of single-product firms and the group of multi-product firms be irrelevant. 
For , we have now  , ,( ) /(av S av S J av J S Jm m m m m mc N c N c N N= + + )m
Proposition 5. With 0ζ > , suppose that , 2 , 2( ) ( )
J J
n J av n J av
m m m mn n
c c c c ζ∈Ψ ∈Ψ− → − +∑ ∑  and 
, ,
, 2 , 2( ) ( )
m S m S
n S av n S av
m m m mn n
c c c c ζ∈Ψ ∈Ψ− → − −∑ ∑ . Thus mean unit cost within each firm groups 
remain fixed, total variance remains fixed, variance for joint-product firms increases, variance 
for single-product firms decreases, while all other variances and covariances remain the same. 
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Then industry profit increases whenever 12 0U ≠  (because 1/mm mmB U< ).   
 
The general intuition for why cost variability among multi-product firms is preferred over 
variability among specialist firms is as follows. Multi-product firms are less constrained in 
adapting to the variability so as to reduce firm costs. While these firms do seek to exploit market 
power, the overall market power effects cancel because unit cost sums within each firm category 
are held fixed. So the net effect is only a reduction in industry costs.  
For more specific intuition we note that there is a strong connection between the cost 
variance transfers discussed above and the LeChatelier principle (Milgrom and Roberts, 1996). 
The ‘principle’ identifies conditions under which the unconstrained response of an input to its 
own price exceeds the response when some means of response have been curtailed. In 
Samuelson’s (1947, pp. 36-39) early proof, the relation 1/mm mmB U≤  for inverted matrices was 
invoked. Here, mmB  captures the total own-price response of a factor when all other factors can 
adapt while 1  captures the partial response when only the factor itself can adapt.  / mmU
In our case, higher variance of unit costs for some product means that (in the aggregate) 
there are more opportunities to adapt so that aggregate costs should fall. But multi-product firms 
are better positioned to adapt. Single-product firms may be considered to be multi-product firms 
acting under the constraint set that all outputs except one be set at zero. The context is different 
in that we are considering responses in the aggregate by firms engaged in strategic interactions in 
the face of downward sloping demands, and not responses by an individual price-taking firm. 
But the mathematical formalization is the same. Theorem 2 in Milgrom and Roberts (1996) 
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corresponds to our Proposition 5.7  
We turn now to comparing ad valorem and specific taxes when some firms are inactive in 
some markets. Write aggregate output under specific taxes only as ( ) ( )J SX t X t+  and that under 
ad valorem taxes only as ( ) ( )J SX Xτ τ+ . From (11), together with some work, equality of total 
output of the mth product under specific taxes with total output of the mth product under ad 
valorem taxes occurs if and only if : {1,2}m∀ ∈
,
,
{1,2}
(1 )
(1 ) ( ) 0.
S av S
m m m m m J av J
im m i m i m i ii
mm
N t c
N B t c U
U
τ τ τ τ τ τ∈
⎡ ⎤− −⎣ ⎦ ⎡ ⎤+ × − − + −⎣ ⎦∑ =  (18) 
The first left-hand term represents the effect of the change in tax regime, moving from ad 
valorem to specific regime, on mth good production by the single output group. The second left-
hand term represents the effect of the tax regime change on production of that good by the multi-
product group of firms. In general the values of imB  are relevant when determining how taxes 
should relate to average costs such that (18) is true. There are circumstances, though, under 
which demand interactions are not relevant. 
Proposition 6. Suppose that  and . Suppose further that, in the situation 
where ad valorem taxes are applied then they are common across goods, i.e., 
,
1 1
av S av Jc c= , ,,2 2av S av Jc c=
1 2τ τ= =τ . Then 
there is a unique vector of specific taxes that holds total output of each good constant regardless 
of the values of the ijB . It is 
, ,
1 2 1 2( , ) ( , ), /(1 )
av J av Jt t c cλ λ λ τ= = τ−
                                                
. This tax vector also holds 
constant the total output of the group of multi-product firms and that of the group of single-
product firms.  
 
7 A result for more than two output markets, analogous to Theorem 1 of Milgrom and Roberts, is 
available from the authors. But the assumption that all utility function cross-products must be 
non-negative is required, i.e., the representative consumer’s utility function must be 
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 Corollary 6.1. Suppose that  and  while ,1 1
av S av Jc c= , ,,2 2av S av Jc c= 1 2τ τ τ= =  in the situation where 
ad valorem taxes are applied, i.e., they are common across goods. Then, relative to this ad 
valorem tax, the vector of specific taxes given by , ,1 2 1 2( , ) ( , ), /(1 )
av J av Jt t c cλ λ λ τ τ= = − , decreases 
tax revenue, increases industry costs, and maintains consumer surplus.   
 
The proof of this corollary follows that in Proposition 2 above. In what follows we continue 
to assume that  and , i.e., for each product the average cost over the group 
of single-product firms equals the average cost over the group of multi-product firms. But ad 
valorem taxes are allowed to differ across the two goods. We will show that production within 
groups changes under the different tax regimes even if total production is fixed, i.e., the 
conclusion in Proposition 6 fails to hold when ad valorem tax rates vary across products. For the 
sake of notational convenience and at no real loss of generality, we assume that . And 
we write . Equation (18) then becomes 
,
1 1
av S av Jc c= , ,
2
S
J
,
2 2
av S av Jc c=
1
SN N=
1 /
SN Nϑ = {1,2}m∀ ∈  
,
,
{1,2}
(1 )
(1 ) ( ) 0.
av J
m m m m av J
im m i m i m i ii
mm
t c
B t c U
U
ϑ τ τ τ τ τ τ∈
⎡ ⎤− −⎣ ⎦ ⎡+ × − − + −⎣∑ ⎤ =⎦  (19) 
Define  
,
* *;
1
av J
m m
m m m m
m
ct t t τξ ;τ= + ≡ −  (20) 
where we may view  as the specific tax that secures the same aggregate output from within the 
group of single-product firms as does the ad valorem tax. Value 
*
mt
*
m mt tξ m= −  is just the difference 
between the specific tax that fixes aggregate output from single-product firms and the specific 
                                                                                                                                                             
supermodular.  
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tax that fixes total output, i.e., satisfies (19). After some work, the following can be established: 
Proposition 7. In two-product oligopoly, suppose , , , , ,1 1
av S av Jc c= , ,2 2av S av Jc c= 1 2S SN N= 1 21 τ τ> >  
, and solutions are interior. If  0=
(a) goods complement in demand (i.e.,  and so 12 0U > 12 0B < ) then 1 0 2ξ ξ< < . That is, for the 
aggregate outputs to be held fixed at the same level as under the ad valorem tax system then a 
positive specific tax is required on good 2 and a specific tax less than tax equivalent  under 
non-joint production is required on good 1. 
*
1t
(b) goods are independent in demand (i.e., 12 0U = ) then 1 20ξ ξ= = . 
(c) goods substitute in demand then either 1 0ξ >  or 2 0ξ <  or both. 
 
Corollary 7.1. Under the conditions of Proposition 7, when the two goods  
(a) complement in demand then the aggregate output of the single-product producers of good 1 
(good 2) is higher (lower) under the ad valorem tax than under the specific tax.  
(b) substitute in demand then either the aggregate output of the single-product producers of good 
1 is lower under the ad valorem tax than under the specific tax or the aggregate output of good 2 
is higher or both. 
 
In part (a) of the corollary, since fixed total output ensures fixed prices, single product 
producers of good 1 are likely to gain on average upon moving to the ad valorem system. Single 
product producers of good 2 are likely to lose on average. We cannot be sure, however, as the 
covariance effects that arose in Proposition 2 (see Example 1) also need to be accounted for. 
Proposition 7 and Corollary 7.1 indicate that it is, in general, not possible to construct a specific 
tax system that has the same impact on each group as does an ad valorem tax system. Thus, an 
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analogy of Proposition 2 to establish the superiority of the ad valorem system over the unit tax 
system will in general be a challenge to obtain in a multi-product oligopoly when not all firms 
are active in all markets. 
 
6.  Oligopsony 
Hamilton (1999) has noted that when the market power is in favor of the buyer, in his case 
monopsony for a single input, then specific taxes may be the preferred instrument. This is 
because ad valorem taxes now increase marginal cost rather than dampen marginal revenue. In 
so doing, they make the power-endowed firm face a less elastic supply curve rather than a more 
elastic demand curve. In what is to follow we adapt our earlier model to show that Hamilton’s 
insight extends to oligopsony and to a multi-input environment.  
Each of  firms uses N M  inputs, and the firms have market power in these local input 
markets. The marginal social benefit for use of the mth input is common across all firms at 
constant value mp  while the nth firm’s use level for that input is . With 
n
mz
N
n
m mn
Z z∈Ω= ∑ , cost 
over inputs is given by the convex function ( )H Z  where 1( , ... , )MZ Z Z= . The supply of inputs 
is competitive in each case so that the mth input price is ( ) /mH H Z Zm= ∂ ∂ . Under specific input 
taxes, a firm’s objective is to [ ]
1( , ... , )
max ( )n n
M M
n
m m m mz z m
p t H Z z∈Ω − −∑ . Under ad valorem taxes, 
the objective is to [ ]
1( , ... , )
max (1 ) ( )n n
M M
n
m m mz z m
p H Zτ∈Ω − +∑ mz
N
.  
For the two tax systems, and using previously defined notation, the private Nash optimality 
conditions are 
  (21) ˆ ˆ ˆUnit : ( ) ( ) 0 , ;
M
n
m m m ms m M Ns
p t H Z H Z z m n∈Ω− − − = ∀ ∈Ω ∀ ∈Ω∑
 ˆ ˆ ˆAd val: (1 ) ( ) ( )(1 ) 0 , .
M
n
m m m ms s s Ms
p H Z H Z z m nτ τ∈Ω− + − + = ∀ ∈Ω ∀ ∈Ω∑  (22) 
The analog of Proposition 2, part (a), is:  
Proposition 8. Suppose the input cost function is of aggregated form ( )H Z , a convex function. 
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Suppose too that input suppliers are price takers. Let unit benefits to all input users be constant 
at mp  in the mth market, and assume input using firms are active in all considered markets. 
Firms choose inputs according to Nash behavior and there exists a unique equilibrium. Then, 
provided that all ad valorem tax rates are non-negative, a vector of commodity-specific ad 
valorem taxes, mτ , that holds market outputs fixed raises less revenue than the corresponding 
vector of commodity-specific unit taxes,  mt .
 
Since there are no revenue or cost heterogeneities, consumer surplus and producer profits do 
not differ under the alternative taxes. So the specific tax raises more revenue at no social welfare 
loss. The key distinction between the oligopoly and oligopsony contexts is that the proportional 
tax is now of form 1 mτ+  rather than 1 mτ− , as in oligopoly. It acts to exaggerate, rather than 
attenuate, market power on the part of the firms.  
 
7.  Conclusion 
In the literature, ad valorem taxes have been shown to dominate specific taxes when only a 
single market is considered under Cournot behavior. But most firms produce for plural markets 
and often compete against the same firms in these different markets. For this reason and in light 
of the popularity of these tax instruments, whether ad valorem taxes dominate specific taxes and 
the extent of such dominance are matters of considerable policy relevance. Our multi-product 
model assumes Cournot behavior, firm participation in all markets, a representative consumer 
demand structure, and convex preferences. We have shown that the ad valorem tax dominance 
result does extend, and we have explored determinants of the extent of cost efficiencies that 
arise. We also describe how relaxing the active-in-all-markets assumption affects the results. 
Finally, we have shown that specific tax dominance for monopsony extends to multi-input 
 19
oligopsony. 
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Appendix 
Proof of Proposition 2. By (4), outputs in each market do not depend on the tax system so that 
consumer surplus is fixed as well.  
Part (a): With  and , total tax revenue under the ad 
valorem tax system ( ) is (weakly) larger than under the unit tax 
system ( ) if 
ˆ ˆ
N
n
m mn
X x∈Ω=∑ 1 2ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ( , , ... , )MX X X X=
ˆ ˆ( )
M
adv
m m mm
T Uτ∈Ω=∑ X X
X
⎤ ≥⎦
ˆ
M
u
m mm
T t∈Ω=∑
  (A1) ˆ ˆ( ) 0.
M
m m m mm
U X t Xτ∈Ω ⎡ ⎤− ≥⎣ ⎦∑
Using (4), this may be written as the requirement 
  (A2) ˆ ˆ ˆ( ) 0.
M M
s ms s mm s
U X X Xτ∈Ω ∈Ω⎡− ⎣∑ ∑
The left-hand side of (A2) can, in turn, be written as: 
 ( )
11 11 2 12 1
1 12 2 22 2 2
1 2
1 1 2 2
ˆ
ˆ1 ˆ ˆ ˆ ,
ˆ
M M
M M
M
M M M MM M
XU U U
U U U XX X X
N
U U U X
τ τ τ
τ τ τ
τ τ τ
⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜− ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠
"
"" # # % # #
"
⎟⎟  (A3) 
where concave  ensures its ( )U ⋅ M M×  matrix Hessian is negative definite. The determinants 
of the principal minors for the square matrix in (A3) are: 
 
1 11 2 12 11 12
1 11 1 11 1 2
1 12 2 22 12 22
1 11 2 12 3 13 11 12 13
1 12 2 22 3 23 1 2 3 12 22 23
1 13 2 23 3 33 13 23 33
0; 0;
0; ;
U U U U
U U
U U U U
U U U U U U
U U U U U U
U U U U U U
τ ττ τ τ ττ τ
τ τ τ
τ τ τ τ τ τ
τ τ τ
= < = >
= < " "
 (A4) 
if the ad valorem tax rates are positive, since matrix A  is negative definite. Thus, provided that 
the ad valorem equivalent tax rates are non-negative then the ad valorem tax system generates 
more revenue.  
Part (b): We must establish that the ad valorem tax also reduces true costs as compared with 
 23
costs under the unit tax. Total cost, under either regime, can be written as  
1ˆ ˆ ˆ( )( );
M M M M
av n av n av av n
m m m m m m m mm n m m
TC c X c c x x c c
N∈Ω ∈Ω ∈Ω ∈Ω
= + − − =∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ ;  (A5) 
where the ˆnmx  pertain to the relevant tax regime. Remember that aggregate outputs are the same 
under the two regimes, see condition (4). So the difference in costs between the two regimes is 
given by comparing the double summation under each tax system. Let ,ˆn umx  be equilibrium firm 
output under the unit tax system, and ,ˆn vmx  under the ad valorem tax system. Using (2)-(3) we 
have: 
, ,ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ( ) ; (1 )( )
M M
n u av n av n v av n av
ms m m s s ms m m m s sm m
U x x c c U x x c cτ∈Ω ∈Ω− = − − − = −∑ ∑ .  (A6) 
Define G as the M M×  matrix with element (1 )ms ms sG U τ= − . With  
 as elements in the 
( )ijU X ≡
2 ( ) / iU X X X∂ ∂ ∂ j M M×  matrix of second derivatives for the utility 
function, write  
  (A7) 
1
11 12 111 12 1
12 22 212 22 21
1 21 2
.
MM
MM
M M MMM M MM
B B BU U U
B B BU U U
B U
B B BU U U
−
−
⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞ ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟ ⎜⎜ ⎟≡ ≡ ≡ ⎜⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠
""
""
# # % ## # % #
""
⎟⎟
Also, write 
 
,
11 1 1
,
, 2 22
,
ˆˆ
ˆˆ 1ˆ ˆ, { , }; ; ;
ˆ ˆ
n i n av
n i n av
n i av n av
n i n av
M MM
Xx c
x cXx i u v x c c
N
x cX
⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟= ∈ = = =⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠
# ##
2 .
M
c
c
c
#
;
 (A8) 
Then, from (A6): 
, , 1ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ; ;n u av n v av n avn n n nx x B x x G R c c
−− = Δ − = Δ ≡ Δ Δ ≡ −  (A9) 
where 1R G−= . Define D as a diagonal matrix with elements 1ii iD τ= −  (and  for i0ijD = j≠ ). 
Then, by construction: 
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1 1 1; ; 1/(1 ); 0,ii i ijG UD R D U EB E D E E i jτ− − −= → = = ≡ = − = ≠ .  (A10) 
Thus, with superscript tr as the transpose operation and MI  as the M M×  identity matrix, use 
(A9) and (A10) to establish the difference in (A5) costs across the two tax regimes as: 
( ) ( )
N N
u v tr tr
n n n Mn n
TC TC B R I E B∈Ω ∈Ω− = Δ − Δ = Δ − Δ∑ ∑ .n  (A11) 
Now,  is a diagonal matrix with elements MK I E≡ − /(1 )ii i iK τ τ= − −  and 0,ijK i j= ≠ .  
Since B is negative definite, and K  is negative semi-definite provided that 0i Miτ ≥ ∀ ∈Ω , it 
follows that cost difference (A11) is a positive semi-definite quadratic form, and hence the 
evaluation of (A11) must be a non-negative scalar. To confirm this, the reader may want to 
multiply out matrix product  and then evaluate principal minors in the manner of (A4). The 
non-negativity of (A11) means costs are smaller under the ad valorem system.    Q 
KB
Proof of Corollary 3.1. From (9): 
 , , , ( 1)ˆ ˆ ˆ ,
M
sep mer av mer av mer mer av mer
m m mm m ms s m mm m ms
ht t U x U x t U x U
N∈Ω
−= + − = + −∑  (A12) 
where the last equality follows from applying Euler’s theorem to function . The theorem 
states that  is homogenous of degree 
mU
mU 1h −  whenever  is homogeneous of degree . 
Thus: 
( )U X h
, 1ˆ(1 ) ,ˆ1
sep mer av mer m
m m mm m mer
mm m
Ut t h U x
h U X
−+ ⎛ ⎞− = − +⎜ −⎝ ⎠

⎟  (A13) 
so that the term in parentheses determines the sign of .    Q mer sepm mt t−
Proof of Proposition 4. We use (6) and its firm-level analog to calculate aggregate costs under 
separation. Under the separation scenario, industry cost deviation from that under firm-invariant 
production at output means is: 
, , , , 11 22
1 1 1 2 2 2
11 22
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ( ) ( )
N N
c c
n n sep av sep n n sep av sep
n n
c x x c x x N N
U U
σ σ
∈Ω ∈Ω− + − = +∑ ∑ ,  (A14) 
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where the ciiσ  are as defined in Example 1. Now use (7) and its firm-level analog to calculate 
aggregate costs under merger. Under the merger scenario and {1,2}MΩ = , then industry cost 
deviation from average production is:  
( )
, , , ,
1 1 1 2 2 2
22 12 11
11 11 12 12 22 22 11 12 22
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ( ) ( )
2 2
N N
n n mer av mer n n mer av mer
n n
c c c c c
c x x c x x
U U UN B B B Nσ σ σ σ σ σ
∈Ω ∈Ω− + −
⎛= + + = − +⎜ ⎟Φ Φ Φ⎝ ⎠
∑ ∑
;c ⎞  (A15) 
where  and the 211 22 12( )U U UΦ = − ijB  are as given in (A7). In (A5), total costs are decomposed 
into two parts, namely (a) , and (b) ˆ
M
av
m mm
c X∈Ω∑ ˆ ˆ( )(M M n av n avm m m mn m c c x x∈Ω ∈Ω − − )∑ ∑ . The 
former, i.e., part (a), are common under merger and separation since taxes are such that the  
are common under merger and separation. Thus, the cost difference is given by subtracting the 
right-most expression set in (A14) from that in (A15) to obtain  
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Now define  
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 (A17) 
where  means equality by definition. Then the right-most expression set in (A16) may be re-
written as  
defn=
11 22 12
1 2 1 2 12
11 22 12
2 2 sig
c c c
U
U U U
σ σ σ θ θ ρ θ θ+ − = − − − × n( ).U  (A18) 
If , then (A18) is negative whenever 12sign( )U = + 1Uρ ≥ − . This is because  
( ) P21 2 1 2 1 2 1 22 2(U 1) .Uθ θ ρ θ θ θ θ ρ θ θ
+ + +
− − − = − − − +
  
 (A19) 
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If , then (A19) is negative whenever 12sign( )U = − 1Uρ ≤ . This is because  
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 (A20) 
So the expression is negative whenever either of the following sufficient condition sets apply:  
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 (A21) 
This is as stated in the Proposition.    Q  
Demonstration of system (13). For jointly producing firms, aggregation of (11) supports  
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where  and , (1/ )
J
av J J n
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c N ∈Ψ= ∑ ˆ ˆJJ nm nX ∈Ψ= mx∑ . Now invert (A22) to obtain  
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 (A23) 
Divide these equations through by JN  and subtract from (11), when the relevant equations in 
that system have also been inverted.    Q 
Proof of Proposition 5. Write the sum of the terms involving ,c Smmσ  in (17) as  
, ,
, .
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Now to understand the shift in cost deviations, write  
, , ,(1 ) ; .J m S
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J S  (A25) 
 27
Define  so that . Then, with  as mth 
product variance over the entire set of producing firms, we have 
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 (A26) 
Since ( )22 2[ (1 ) ]J Sm m m mN Nα α− + Γ  is independent of cost deviations, the reallocation 
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J J
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  (A27) 
So cost declines whenever the change [ 1/ ]mm mmB U ζ−  is negative, i.e., 1/mm mmB U< . But 11B  
 and also 2 211 12 11 11 22 121/ /[ ( )] 0U U U U U U− = − < 2 222 22 12 22 11 22 121/ /[ ( )] 0B U U U U U U− = − < .    Q 
Proof of Proposition 6. Under the stated conditions then (18) becomes  
,
,
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(1 )
(1 ) 0 {1,2}.
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τ τ τ τ∈
⎡ ⎤− −⎣ ⎦ ⎡ ⎤+ × − − = ∀ ∈⎣ ⎦∑  (A28) 
If this is to be true regardless of the values of the ijB , then  and  must apply. 
Furthermore, this relation sets both
,
1 1
av Jt cλ= ,2 2av Jt cλ=
 left-hand terms in (18) to equal zero. That is, it imposes no 
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change in total output by either single-product firms or multi-product firms.    Q 
Proof of Proposition 7. Substitute (20) into (19) to obtain {1,2}m∀ ∈ : 
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If, in addition, 1 2 0τ τ> =  then (A29) resolves to the system  
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 (A30) 
Since ,  and 11 22 /B U= Φ 22 11 /B U= 12 12 /B U= − Φ  where 211 22 12 0U U UΦ = − > , inversion 
delivers 
22 12 ,
221 2 21 12
,
2 1 1 1 1
12 11
11
2
11 22
;
(1 ) (1 )
1 2 0.
av J
av J
B B
U c UB
U cB B
U
U U
ϑ
ξ τ
ξ ϑτ τ
ϑ ϑ
⎛ ⎞+ −⎜ ⎟⎛ ⎞−⎛ ⎞ ⎜ ⎟= ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟ − Λ ⎜ ⎟ − −⎝ ⎠ ⎝− +⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
+Λ = + >Φ
⎠  (A31) 
Consider (A31). Part (b) of the Proposition is immediate, while part (a) follows since 
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 (A32) 
Here,  for otherwise profit per unit output would be non-positive 
for some single-product firms and outputs would not be interior. 
, ,
1 1 1 2 2(1 ) 0
av J av JU c c Uτ− − > > −
Part (c): We may use (A31) or (A32) to write  
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 (A33) 
Suppose, contrary to the assertion in (c), that 2 0 1ξ ξ≥ ≥ . Then 11 22 22 12[ ]/[U U U U K]ϑ+ Φ ≤  and 
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ϑ+ Φ ≤] . Since the expressions on both sides of both inequalities are 
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must hold. This implies that . But 
 and , so that (A34) is invalid.    Q 
2 2 2 2 2
11 22 11 22 11 22 11 22 12[ ] 2U U U U U U U U Uϑ ϑ ϑ+ Φ = + Φ + Φ ≤ 2
>2 211 222 0U U ϑ ϑΦ + Φ > 2 2 211 22 11 22 12 11 22 0U U U U U U U− = Φ
Proof of Proposition 8. The method is as in Proposition 2, so we will only give guidelines. Total 
input use in each market is the same under either system whenever taxes satisfy  
 1ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ( ) ( ) ; .
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m m m s ms s M s ss n
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 (A35) 
Total tax revenue under the unit tax system ( ˆ
M
u
m mm
T ∈Ω=∑ ) exceeds (weakly) that under the 
proportional tax system ( ) if ˆ ˆ( )
M
adv
m m mm
T H Zτ∈Ω=∑ ˆ ˆ( ) 0M m m m mm t H Z Zτ∈Ω ⎡ ⎤Z − ≥⎣ ⎦∑ . Using 
(A35), this may be written as 
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The result follows from convexity of ( )H Z  and use of the method in Proposition 2, part (a).    Q 
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